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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
AND GRAMMAR 
Remnants of Words in Indian Grammar 
Sanjit Chakraborty 
JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY 
In Indian philosophy, the import of word is intimately 
connected to the question, “what sort of an entity does 
the importation of a word stand for?” We see the principle 
that makes an inextricable relation between words and 
meanings. The word is a primary constituent that constructs 
a sentence, and people understand the meaning of a 
word throughout the sentence holism (corporate body of 
words). This thesis contrasts with meaning atomism, where 
the representation of words seems semantically atomic or 
relies on the particular word, not to the whole sentence. 
The primacy of word sets for an object, and the meaning of 
the particular word can be derived from the object it stands 
for. 
Jātiśabda (the general/nominal term), the earlier trend of 
the Indian philosophy of language, instigates a kind of 
relation between two rival groups—Vyakti-śakti-vāda and 
Jāti-śakti-vāda—or, more precisely, a debate pertaining to 
the meaning particularism versus the meaning generalism 
from the sense of determining the reference of the general 
term. Vyakti-śakti-vādin asks for a descriptive approach 
of the singular term by considering that the meaning is 
correlated to the nominal object. In our practical purposes 
when we strive to fix the reference, then we always prefer to 
denote the individual instead of an imperceptible universal. 
In the context like “The horse is dying,” here the reference 
of the horse is metonymically recognized by the particular 
horse, not by its genus. The Jāti-śakti-vādin argues that the 
purport of connotation of a word lies in an individual that is 
determined by a universal. This riddance of the individual 
to comprise into a universal domain can be drawn by an 
example like “The dodos are becoming extinct.” We can 
properly understand the meaning of the whole sentence 
if we look over the predicate term and its coherence 
relation to the subject term, i.e., “dodo” bird. The property 
of possession (extinction) of generic birds like “dodo” in 
our example is going to be extinct bird. This distributive 
predicate successfully merges not in the individual bird 
itself like a “dodo,” but collaborately encodes the genus 
of the bird in general. The truth value of the proposition 
relies on the collective value of the predicate qualified by 
the universalistic sense or properties. 
Here, the key concern is whether the word itself provides 
foundation of universal or something else. I think this sort of 
the metaphysical analysis of linguistic terms ensue a debate 
in Indian philosophy of language that is highly valued by 
the grammarians. The Vyakti-śakti-vāda delimits a word in 
terms of the particular term by following a realistic view (the 
conception of referential expressions makes sense here). 
Jāti-śakti-vāda contends that the import of the word is in 
no way similar to a particular; actually, it is “the universal in 
pursuance of laws of logical parsimony.”1 Ganeri clarifies, 
“For clearly one might be a referentialist about definite 
description without being so about indefinite descriptions; 
likewise, one might be a referentialist about generic uses, 
but not about non-generic uses.”2 The Nyāya-Vaiṡesika and 
the Mīmāṁsakas, the realist schools of Indian philosophy, 
emphasize on a sentence that may be affirmative or 
negative but have a realistic stand (reference) to the object. 
The school gets rid of the thesis of an individual edifice 
of reality that gets closer to the conceptual schemata. Let 
us see the problem from a different level. My point is to 
understand the conceding approach of connecting words 
with ontological categories. Simply, the concern is how 
does the particular term “cow” categorically connote the 
universal “cowhood”? 
WORD-MEANING INTERACTION 
Kumārila underpins the debate in connection to the word-
essence, which apprehends the meaning of a word that 
can be impeded only if different speakers failed to identify 
the particular word, since the identity of the word looks 
like a pointer that specifies the existence of a simple word-
unit. In the case, like “the cow is standing up,” a hearer can 
understand that a speaker may talk about a particular cow
instead of cow genus. Here, the popular use assumes the 
basic identity of the word and meaning as an unwanted 
premise. The principal understanding of Mīmāmsāsutra, I 
think, deciphers the universal as an exclusive connotation 
that can only concern about eternal words since the 
efficiencies are not only associated with the individual word 
like cow (determinatum) but similarly to self-same word 
cowhood as a universal that looks as determinant. The law 
of parsimony defines the comprehension of universal that 
can treat individual as a substratum and could be deduced 
from the indication (laksanā). Let us take an example. The
˙ ˙sentence “the smoke is burning” remains nonsensical 
until the predicate term “burning” cannot be construed 
by the subject term “smoke” or similarly by “fire” since 
an inference takes a prominent place here to deduce the 
latter from the former. The naturalism that is preserved by 
Mīmāmsā hinges a sort of non-convention-based language 
as a key tool that has a universalistic appeal. Besides, the 
logic that Mīmāmsākas inculcate in defense of their thesis 
is an amalgam of universal with the nuance of language. 
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However, Navya Nyāya aims to criticize both the opinions 
(the meaning particularism and the meaning generalism). 
As we know, Gautama (Nyaya-Sutra, 2.2.66) articulates the 
meaning of a word in the sense of particular (vākti), form 
(akrti), and universal (jāti). Gautama barely stresses on the
˙concept of form while he hints at a particular as qualified 
by universal. Early Naiyāyikas believe in the connotation 
of a particular term that not only resides in the universal 
but also to the qualities, actions, and the substance 
as a configuration from a holistic scheme. This theory 
assigns integrity between the perceptual contents with 
the conceptual cognitions. If we only put the conceptual 
cognition as a prime configuration of the connotation of a 
particular term (like mango), then the taste of mango should 
not be cognized though the quality or the universal aspect 
of sweetness or sourness of the particular mango but by 
the perception of the content of mango that is cognized by 
rasana (palate) only. 
Nyāya philosophy enhances the sense of public meaning 
as a sharable concept. The public meaning can precede 
the context of a speaker’s belief since the word meaning 
is derived from the realm of sentence meaning that relies 
on the public sharability of meaning. Navya Nyāya resists 
this particular method to underline Kumarila’s position on 
the meaning of a word that could be impeded in relation 
to the number of speakers who may fail to recognize the 
particular word, since the identity of the word as a pointer 
denotes the existence of a particular word instead of the 
genus. However, Navya Nyāya’s stance (semantic holism) 
looks promising since they consider that the meaning of a 
sentence is a unified relational corpus, whereas the word 
cannot set as an individual component. The other schools 
treat the meaning of a word as a nonlinguistic entity, but 
the grammarians first emphasize the meaning of a word as 
a linguistic symbol. 
COLLAPSE OF CONVENTIONALISM
In Vaiśes ika philosophy, we notice that the relation between
˙words and meanings is regarded as a matter of convention, 
and Nyāya accepts this hypothesis strongly. However, 
Patañjali looks at Kātyāyana’s Vārttika that instigates an 
eternal relation of word-meaning by discarding the sense 
of conventialism like Mīmāmsā. Patañjali’s Mahābhāsha
indicates that a universal seems one and it can be 
expressed by a word through the power of denotation 
(Ekā ākrtih, sā cā bhidhīyate). We can know this eternal 
nonderived linkage between the word and the meaning 
through people’s invariable behaviors. Matilal clarifies, 
“People are seen to be using words to convey meaning, 
but they do not make an effort to manufacture words. . . . 
Jaimini in his Mīmāmsāsutra, 1.1.5 says that the relation 
between word and meaning is ‘non-derived’ or ‘uncreated’ 
(autpattika). Both Jaimini and Katyayana (see above) used 
two rather difficult words, autpattika and siddha, which do 
not have any transparent sense.”3 
Mīmāmsākas might insinuate this problem in two different 
senses: 
a)	 Let us consider a word “X” (a pen). The supporters 
of eternal or non-derivative word-meaning relation 
can urge that “X” (a pen) is not an object that is 
created by an individual since it is created by the 
omnipotent mind (God). 
b)	 We cannot expose the explicit origin of the majority 
of words. This procedure hints that words and their 
relation to meanings and referents are derived 
from the omnipotent mind that is beyond of any 
human endeavor. 
Kumārila seems right as he challenges conventionalism 
to say that any convention should have to maintain the 
meaning relation within the edge of language, not prior to 
language. It looks promising to consider that words have a 
primacy over meanings while meanings are only denoted 
by words. The purport of words and its relation to meanings 
intermingles at the level of verbal judgment that confines 
the implication of public meaning as a conjecture of the 
causal referential directness to the reality. 
The Indian grammarians (Vaiyākarana) believe that 
the word evolves out of śabda-brahman (where words 
represent ultimate reality). The cognition of a word meets 
the criteria of the corresponding object of the world. 
Here, meaning connotes the word and the word-meaning 
relation relies on the process of the usages. Patañjali in his 
Mahābhās ya refers to the contention of words (śabdah) 
˙that transmit to the substratum of the world. He considers 
that the appearance is congregated with the world through 
the metaphysical identification of words and meanings 
conjuncture. Patañjali stresses on the nature of cognition, 
but an eternal verbum (or supreme word) remains unaltered 
in grammarian as it lies beyond time and space. External 
verbum sounds as a transcendent principle that segregates 
all attribution qualities. Besides, eternal verbum as a unitary 
principle emerges the eternity of supreme reality, an ideal 
language form (paśyantī) that goes through the threefold 
cords of verbal, pre-verbal, and transcendental reality. In 
Vākyapadīya, external verbum is considered as the essence 
that is doubtlessly real and independent (śabdattavaṁ yad 
aksaram). Sastri writes, “That the Eternal Verbum can be 
˙regarded as the Supreme Light that manifests different 
objects may be clearly understood with reference to our 
everyday experience. It is an undeniable fact that whatever 
passes current in our thought is determined by an articulate 
verbal form.”4 
Grammarians argue that the cognitive process of a newborn 
baby remains determinate, as the form of his/her knowledge 
is a sort of inarticulate or un-manifestative knowledge that 
links to the pre-natural knowledge. The reason is that the 
word according to grammarians is the material cause of 
the external world and any object beyond time and space 
dimension is comprehended by the subject’s cognition. 
If there were no subjects or the concomitant objects, still 
words would have been in the universe as these are all 
pervading and eternal. For grammarians, eternal words 
are ahead of the spatio-temporal dimension. The eternal 
verbum emphasizes a comprehensible immutable reality 
that manifests in plurality and differentiation. In brief, 
analogically words are one and unique. Actually, the 
theory of evaluation of words for grammarians is a kind of 
unmanifested, immutable word essence (śabda-vivarta­
vāda) that is independent of any kind of transformation 
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(parināma). Like Vedāntin, grammarians’ emphasis on the 
˙material cause (upādāna kārana), an unchanging matrix that
˙manifolds the phenomenal change (aparināmā prakrtih).
˙ ˙ ˙Bhartrhari considers that one should not confuse between 
˙ ˙two different objects that are individually connoted to the 
different verbal expressions. This intimate relation between 
the object and the word manifolds a causation that goes 
towards the eternal verbum as the material cause of the 
world and the object. Now, one can argue whether the 
referent of a word differs from the word itself or the object 
that is determined by the word is identical with the word 
in nature. Bhartrhari accepts the two alternatives and says,
˙ ˙
Svamātrā paramātrā va śrutya prakramyate yathā 
Tathai’va rūd hatām eti tayā hy artho vidhīyate
˙(Vākyapadīya, 1.130) 
Bhartrhari emphasizes that the eternal verbum underlies
˙ ˙a principle that accords objects and every being without 
adjoining any genuine amendment. This doctrine extends 
a kind of uniformism that discards any bifurcation between 
the word and the world. Eternal verbum as a unitary 
principle of words emerges from the eternity of supreme 
reality (iha dvau śabdātmānau-kāryo nityaś ca [Punyarāja’s 
˙commentary, 50]). 
ANALYSIS 
Bhartrhari      ’s proposal tracks down a kind of normativity of
˙ ˙grammar in order to strengthen the impact of grammar on
epistemology. It sounds interesting when he says that all
object-classes pivot on word-classes (Vākyapadīya, 1.15).
Grammarians, especially Bhartrhari, are the leading adherent
˙ ˙of monism who ensure that a word in its essence can be
considered as an indivisible unit where the plurality of the
linguistic forms and worldly phenomena has an interim
pragmatic validity. One can ask whether we can deflect class
characteristic (universal) from an individual. Bhartrhari clarifies
˙ ˙that the universal is the personification of the individual that
looks unchanged through all its periods (padārthasya prāna­
˙pradah). It is intimately entwined with qualities and actions
˙that have relation to the substratum, but the substance sounds
nonrelative to the essence of the universal. Universal resides
in each individual falling into the same class. However, it is
not required to understand all the substitutes of the universal
as infinite numbers bound it. Sastri clarifies Patañjali’s stand
on the universal and its relation to meaning that is closer to
grammarians. Sastri writes, “In fact, a universal is neither a
summation of individuals nor collectively inherent in the
latter. It is a fact that a universal occurs in individuals and,
when understood as a meaning, it includes an individual as a
substratum of it.”5 
A particular phrase like “pot exists” denotes to the referent, 
i.e., a particular pot that exists, although the content of 
specific terms like “heaven,” “hell,” “intelligence,” etc. 
has no reference fixation (existential reference) in the 
objective world. So here, the denotation of the empty 
terms cannot deduce from the existential referents. Despite 
the denotation of the word from the universal, particular, 
or quality, etc., the compelling relation (a syntactical 
relation) revolves around the word-meaning interaction by 
discarding the denotation method. Bhartrhari advocates the 
˙ ˙
same attitude like Patañjali in his writing. Bhartrhari thinks 
˙ ˙that the individual character of a word is a type of generous 
supplement linked to the general characteristic. 
Another clue is that the import of a word relies on the 
context sensitivity of the persons by depending on 
different impressions (vāsanā). These kinds of different 
opinions exemplify the training of different philosophical 
schools and their way of understanding the problem, 
although to understand the ultimate reality, one has to 
be blessed with the vision of ultimate truth. Our inter-
social and experimental knowledge cannot grasp the 
transcendental truth, so we should not put a great deal of 
reliance on perceptual knowledge and the denotation of 
the word from an individualistic sense. Bhartrhari, I assume,
˙ ˙holds a model of indeterminism about the import of word-
meaning relation that hints towards an unfeasible attempt 
to get a universal approval on the meaning of a word and 
its consequences. As the meaning of a word depends on 
the society and an agent’s preference, so the problem of 
incongruity or divergence in the case of denotation may 
recur. Besides, Bhartrhari attunes an import of a word as
˙ ˙fiction, although Bhartrhari strongly believes in the reality
˙ ˙of sentences and the conception of meaning in terms of an 
inseparable unit. Bhartrhari questions about the objective
˙ ˙validity of words and meanings. This thesis denies the 
appeal of Abhihitānvayavādin who considers that the 
meaning of a word does not stem from putting together 
the meaning of each constituent; neither the meaning of 
a word can be deduced from the corporate body of the 
sentence as propagated by Anvitābhidāhnavādin. Meaning 
for the grammarians—especially Bhartrhari—is regarded as
˙ ˙an indivisible unit that can be explained in the course of the 
meaning of an unreal word that comprises it. For Bhartrhari
˙ ˙the sentence seems real, but words are in vaikaharī level 
(ordinary speech that takes place in spatio-temporal
forms) useful fiction that cannot relate to the empirical 
real objective. The point is that the semantic and syntaxical 
part of words remains unreal. Bhartrhari emphasizes, “The
˙ ˙śabda that is designative of meaning is an individual unit, a 
sequenceless whole, but it is revealed through the divided 
items (noisy realties produced in proper sequences). 
The latter gets intermixed with the object/meaning for it 
constitutes the very nature of the object/meaning.”6 
Bhartrhari ’ s sphota-vāda nourishes the threefold doctrine 
˙ ˙ ˙of letters, words, and sentences. The term Sphota refers 
˙to the word-meaning liaison from a causal and effectual 
efficiency. The use of the word is considered as the 
instruction for engaging with certain sphota. We know 
˙that sphota (śabda) is in nature indivisible and distinct 
˙from any kind of internal sequence. Bhartrhari thinks 
˙ ˙that there is pada-sphota, which refers to the word as a
˙meaning-bearing unit, whereas vākya-sphota indicates 
˙to sentence, i.e., nonsequence and part less whole. It 
is controversial that sentences in Bhartrhari ’s sense are 
˙ ˙regarded as a meaning bearing unit, but sphota in its real 
˙sense interchange with the substratum, a kind of linguistic 
unit that is akin to meaning. Actually, sphota is like the 
˙non-differentiated language principle. The metaphysical 
standpoint of Bhartrhari instigates that the self is identical
˙ ˙with language and this state is called paśyantī stage, while 
language and thought, which transmit an undifferentiated 
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state where the proper articulation of utterances closes to 
an intermediary stage (pre-verbal stage). In this pre-verbal 
stage, the speaker considers a differentiation between 
thought and language. This intermediate stage is familiar 
to the name of madhyamā vāk. The third stage is called 
the verbal stage (vaikaharī) that stands for speaker’s word-
meaning relation and the comprehension of the hearer. 
Here, the uttered sound can be perceived by our sense
organs. So without comprehending the sound, an agent
cannot understand what word (śabda) actually is. Now the
interesting question is whether Bhartrhari ’s account tends 
˙	 ˙toward monism or not. If we clearly go through Bhartrhari ’s
˙	 ˙analysis, then the pertinent point that we notice is his 
quest for the transcendental word essence that he called 
the first principle of the universe, and the sphota theory
˙is doubtlessly aligned with the ultimate reality (sābda 
Brahma). The manifestation that Bhartrhari preserved looks
˙	 ˙at a perfect knowledge of an individual where without being 
connected to any thought, no communicative language may 
ever exist. So the word precedes knowledge hypothesis 
sounds acceptable. In paśyantī level, language and meaning 
are one and inseparable, but at the verbal level, these may 
differ. Sphota doctrine implies a reunion between the 
˙symbol and the signifier. Bhartrhari       refutes Mīmām sākas’ 
˙	 ˙ ˙opinion that we get sentence meaning conjointly through 
the word meaning. There is a mutual linkage between the 
sentence meaning and the word meaning. The sentence 
meaning is nothing but the sequence of words’ meaning. 
These theories preserve a kind of atomism. Bhartrhari
˙’s outlook defines the sentence meaning as an indivisible ˙ 
unit that cannot comprehend the atomistic approach of 
meaning. In loka-vyavahara (human practice), we undertake 
the holistic approach of language learning in the atomistic 
unit that correlates words and its meaning separately. The 
indivisible structure of the sentence is an internal part of 
language, but the manifestation that makes the whole into 
part is an external approach that is called speech (nāda). 
Sphota and nāda are not two distinct issues while grasping
˙the one means grasping the other at the same time. In fact, 
grammarian thinks nāda as an overlay and qualified facade 
of real language (sphota). Sphota reflects in the nāda as the 
˙ ˙color red is reflected on the crystal. Moreover, Bhartrhari
˙	 ˙urges that the comprehension of sphota is conditionally 
˙(instrumentally) derived from the nāda just like through 
our visual system we can see a tree, etc.7 In this visual 
perception, an agent may be unaware of the visual faculty 
and its features. In Patañjali’s words, nāda is an attribute of 
sphota. Here the cognition of nadā is unable to precede the
˙cognition of sphona. 
˙ 
One can disagree with grammarians’ hypothesis on the 
utility of language. In grammarian school, language plays 
three different roles at a time, communication (pratipādana), 
human practice (loka-vyavahara), and cognition (jñāna). 
If we would like to see language as a communication, 
then the process of comprehension (pratipatti) precedes 
communication (pratipādana). It is a sort of speech 
transaction where speakers accumulate speech reception 
in the context of speech meaning referred to by some 
speech acts. Language as a human practice endorses 
the concept of speech power that relates to the explicit 
language. How could the specific language come up? The 
answer is through language disintegration (apabhraṁśa), 
but it is also true that the generalized language competence 
(śabda-tattva) can manifest a sort of specific language 
through vāsanā as an innate capability. This speech-bond 
procedure is causally dependent on the subject’s will (it 
may be God’s will or a person’s will). Language as cognition 
brings a linguistic act that accompanies comprehension 
and generalized language competence with cognition 
(experience in mundane level). However, in particular, 
Bhartrhari   hints at the ultimate form of language where 
˙	 ˙the purity of the word generates the manifested essential 
characters. Without believing in the ideal language form 
(paśyantī), no grammatical form can elucidate how does 
the word and meaning manifest on the sphota theory (real 
śabda-bodha). Language seems an intrinsic component of 
an individual’s awareness. The learning process that is also 
nourished by this awareness can be gradually increased 
since the procedure of cognitive awareness is inseparably 
construed by words. 
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